Cliodynamics - a scientific approach to history - and it’s gloomy forecasts

egb_hibs

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Just finished a book on this;

Amazon product ASIN 0241553482
Here’s the wiki explanation:

Cliodynamics - Wikipedia).

Anyway it’s basically about applying scientific and data modelling techniques to history. Researchers gather huge datasets about historical societies then develop modelling to try to understand what’s going on. They can then, far more readily than with the climate say, use them to forecast social developments.

Anyhow, you’ll not be surprised to learn they forecast trouble ahead. They identify common themes in social improvement and collapse, what they call integrative and disintegrative phases, which follow roughly predictable time intervals, and we are heading into a period of disintegration.

While events vary by social circumstance, the most recurring themes are ‘elite over production and popular immiseration’. In simple terms, too many silver spoons get created for positions available to them. The surplus become ‘counter elites’ and, stewing in resentment and entitlement, adopt radical causes (form coming from the circumstances of the day). Meanwhile the elites have got over numerous by rigging the economic system to shaft everyone else, which happens invariably when they are in a position to do so.

The books then applies all this to the contemporary USA, though there are obvious parallels to the UK; far too many people go to university for them to benefit from available roles to which they then feel entitled. They become competing elites and take over what were once labour parties and direct them to elite ends, with - in our time - identity politics facilitating globalisation and eroding labour strength. Meanwhile these things and globalisation allow the incumbent elite to run amok gathering loot and impoverishing everyone else.

The models forecast the 2020s to be time of immense turmoil, which according to the book is now past the point of no return. It goes on to describe how modelling shows different responses then steadying the ship or simply setting up more of the same a few decades hence.

There’s other stuff which again will be familiar; the elites of left and right choking off anti establishment moves from Bernie Sanders or Donald Trump (Brexit the obvious UK parallel) but is made more interesting by references to continually repeating examples from history.
 
The books features the usual academic blind spots, implying that neo liberalism replaced something other than a failing system, and not touching on our unique inability to replenish our ranks which necessitates impoverishing globalism. However, it is admirably clear eyed for an academic venture and no doubt will have some readers choking on their cornflakes in acknowledging the republicans are more likely to become a workers revolutionary party than the elitist democrats.
 
Just finished a book on this;

Amazon product ASIN 0241553482
Here’s the wiki explanation:

Cliodynamics - Wikipedia).

Anyway it’s basically about applying scientific and data modelling techniques to history. Researchers gather huge datasets about historical societies then develop modelling to try to understand what’s going on. They can then, far more readily than with the climate say, use them to forecast social developments.

Anyhow, you’ll not be surprised to learn they forecast trouble ahead. They identify common themes in social improvement and collapse, what they call integrative and disintegrative phases, which follow roughly predictable time intervals, and we are heading into a period of disintegration.

While events vary by social circumstance, the most recurring themes are ‘elite over production and popular immiseration’. In simple terms, too many silver spoons get created for positions available to them. The surplus become ‘counter elites’ and, stewing in resentment and entitlement, adopt radical causes (form coming from the circumstances of the day). Meanwhile the elites have got over numerous by rigging the economic system to shaft everyone else, which happens invariably when they are in a position to do so.

The books then applies all this to the contemporary USA, though there are obvious parallels to the UK; far too many people go to university for them to benefit from available roles to which they then feel entitled. They become competing elites and take over what were once labour parties and direct them to elite ends, with - in our time - identity politics facilitating globalisation and eroding labour strength. Meanwhile these things and globalisation allow the incumbent elite to run amok gathering loot and impoverishing everyone else.

The models forecast the 2020s to be time of immense turmoil, which according to the book is now past the point of no return. It goes on to describe how modelling shows different responses then steadying the ship or simply setting up more of the same a few decades hence.

There’s other stuff which again will be familiar; the elites of left and right choking off anti establishment moves from Bernie Sanders or Donald Trump (Brexit the obvious UK parallel) but is made more interesting by references to continually repeating examples from history.
Interesting. Surely one of the major drivers of changes in western society, at least in the 19th century, was the emergence of a financially empowered middle class who were denied access to political power. That was (the rather naive) hope for engagement with China in the late 20th century. Are they competing elites and why does it not appear to have any visible traction in China?

Does the book raise the university issue or is that your overlay? Finally, isn't this all a bit deterministic for you? Marxism as a predictive rather than analytical tool?
 
Interesting. Surely one of the major drivers of changes in western society, at least in the 19th century, was the emergence of a financially empowered middle class who were denied access to political power. That was (the rather naive) hope for engagement with China in the late 20th century. Are they competing elites and why does it not appear to have any visible traction in China?

Does the book raise the university issue or is that your overlay? Finally, isn't this all a bit deterministic for you? Marxism as a predictive rather than analytical tool?
That financially empowered middle class would be an example of a counter elite that replaced the existing elite, sometimes peaceably, sometimes violently. That’s the core recurring dynamic (allegedly). I read many years ago that much of the mayhem in modern history coincides with youth bulges, and it’s also well established that revolutions are invariably products of a frustrated bourgeoise and not the proletariat - these things seem to gel with the thesis. We don’t have a youth bulge right now but we do have an educated youth bulge i think.

Which brings me to; No the university example is not an overlay, it’s part of the current iteration (as well as some previous ones) of ‘elite over production’. In the past it contributed to, for example, the rise of Russian nihilism in the mid 19th century. This is an example given where subsequent reforms delayed the impact, albeit only for a short while. In other cases elite over production comes from such brutally simple dynamics as polygamy, where the great and the good churn out excess heirs through their harems.

On determinism point, it’s not a Marxist book but nevertheless I take your point on caution re such things. The author makes it too, pointing to a couple of fairly risible books I have also read, that are the products of CIA and European research, which point to those horrible maga sorts pulling the roof down. Those books were also very ideological (you’d perhaps be surprised by how much CIA analysts appear to mirror NYT or Guardian columnists these days - but it’s not really surprising given their job is to protect the established power structure) and basically took the view of those organs, ie that the immiserated mass are deplorables rather than manifest victims of an elitist political duopoly and exploitative globalism.

The models used by those sources, use 50 years of input data and were good at predictions for +10 years thereafter and then in the authors view collapsed. His take is their whole premises were based on post ww2 circumstances and were basically parochial, and fell apart as the world moved on. The academic effort he is involved in has data going back to the ancient world and is less interested in passing trends like capitalism or socialism than structures of power and influence (plus climate, health, economic conditions etc).

I don’t have a view on the overall picture, but I do think it describes what is happening now. Whether that is due to a strength of the approach or some kind of confirmation bias in reading the past through the lens of the present, I don’t know.
 
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Ps re China Q; the focus is on societies and how they develop or unravel- so China would represent an external pressure on the US in the context of the section on today. But the focus is on the decohering of the US from within rather than international relations, as the liberal elites become separated from the masses they are immiserating (China being a method of them so doing via moving manufacturing offshore). Note he is not suggesting this is their intent per se, it’s just done because it makes economic sense, ie it funnels wealth upward into the elite.
 
Ps re China Q; the focus is on societies and how they develop or unravel- so China would represent an external pressure on the US in the context of the section on today. But the focus is on the decohering of the US from within rather than international relations, as the liberal elites become separated from the masses they are immiserating (China being a method of them so doing via moving manufacturing offshore). Note he is not suggesting this is their intent per se, it’s just done because it makes economic sense, ie it funnels wealth upward into the elite.
I think China is interesting because, so far, it hasn't seen an internal assertion of middle class aspiration for power. I say it hasn't, but it certainly isn't visible. It could be that the Chinese state apparatus is so effective at suppressing dissent. It could also be that the emerging elites have been successfully bought off. Or that the CCP allows access to power.

Certainly the 19th century revolutionary period in Europe could see parallels with China today: industrialisation; economic growth and emerging middle class; moving from an agrarian economy and a big emphasis on trade.

Do you think the thesis would apply to China as experiencing the same internal tensions as the US rather that just a device for the 'elites' to increase power? And if not why not.
 
@Archie I've not explained myself well, apologies, let me try again.

The book is structured broadly as so;

Explains the method in overview (and then in more details in appendices)

Gives numerous examples from history from which thesis emerges

Applies thesis to contemporary USA

...so in the context of the last section China is an external pressure on the US as the focus is on what makes societies (in this case the US) thrive or unravel. But absolutely the same applies to China and indeed its the subject of some of the historical cases. Hopefully that makes sense now?

China is actually in big trouble now, potentially facing its own '2008 moment' economically and with its already parlous birth rate collapsing (less than half what it was in 2016).

That said another theme in the book is it takes an awful lot to shift a country culturally ...after periods of upheaval some approximation of the cultural norm usually (but not always) reasserts itself. Kinda 'say hello to the new boss, same as the old boss' stuff - the elites change readily but the social structure is a lot slower moving.

Russia is a good example of this; from tsardom, to communism to whatever you'd call it now; still ends up with a strong man boss and his henchmen.
 
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@Archie I've not explained myself well, apologies, let me try again.

The book is structured broadly as so;

Explains the method in overview (and then in more details in appendices)

Gives numerous examples from history from which thesis emerges

Applies thesis to contemporary USA

...so in the context of the last section China is an external pressure on the US as the focus is on what makes societies (in this case the US) thrive or unravel. But absolutely the same applies to China and indeed its the subject of some of the historical cases. Hopefully that makes sense now?

China is actually in big trouble now, potentially facing its own '2008 moment' economically and with its already parlous birth rate collapsing (less than half what it was in 2016).

That said another theme in the book is it takes an awful lot to shift a country culturally ...after periods of upheaval some approximation of the cultural norm usually (but not always) reasserts itself. Kinda 'say hello to the new boss, same as the old boss' stuff - the elites change readily but the social structure is a lot slower moving.

Russia is a good example of this; from tsardom, to communism to whatever you'd call it now; still ends up with a strong man boss and his henchmen.
Thanks for the clarification. I can see how the thesis might apply in the US, where there is space to create 'new elites'. The tech boom is an example of that with Gates, Musk etc. etc. It's less clear how this would happen in China. In Russia the space was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opportunistic grabbing/theft of state assets. There seems to be no sense of that in China. So maybe this purported model only works in certain more open societies?

On another point. The issues in China pose a real dilemma for the west. Having empowered China with the large scale transfer of manufacturing, and critically facilitating the shift from an assembly manufacturing position to a fully fledged R and D leader, what is the next step? Maintaining trade relationships empowers China more. Reining it in has the potential to cause economic shock in China that might make armed conflict more likely. No easy answers in this one.
 
Thanks for the clarification. I can see how the thesis might apply in the US, where there is space to create 'new elites'. The tech boom is an example of that with Gates, Musk etc. etc. It's less clear how this would happen in China. In Russia the space was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opportunistic grabbing/theft of state assets. There seems to be no sense of that in China. So maybe this purported model only works in certain more open societies?

On another point. The issues in China pose a real dilemma for the west. Having empowered China with the large scale transfer of manufacturing, and critically facilitating the shift from an assembly manufacturing position to a fully fledged R and D leader, what is the next step? Maintaining trade relationships empowers China more. Reining it in has the potential to cause economic shock in China that might make armed conflict more likely. No easy answers in this one.
No it’s absolutely not tied to open societies, which make up a fraction of those covered going back to ancient times, ditto capitalism (which I guess is the same thing) contra Moaty’s assumption this is a form of Marxist analysis. Capitalism, communism and liberalism are fleeting and situational in terms of what it is looking at (with whatever greater or lesser degree of success).

It talks for example, about Soviet communism and how Stalin solved the problem through his purges. In that kind of setting the competing factions are within the ruling nomenklatura, same with imperial courts etc. The point is systems produce too many for them all to be kept sweet with suitable positions so they start scheming away. In eastern cultures, the first thing heirs to the throne often had to do on ascent was slaughter all their male siblings - same principle.

It also specifically covers dynastic China, from which the CCP actually differs little.

China is screwed, but it has us by the balls nonetheless. Dangerous times.
 
No it’s absolutely not tied to open societies, which make up a fraction of those covered going back to ancient times, ditto capitalism (which I guess is the same thing) contra Moaty’s assumption this is a form of Marxist analysis. Capitalism, communism and liberalism are fleeting and situational in terms of what it is looking at (with whatever greater or lesser degree of success).

It talks for example, about Soviet communism and how Stalin solved the problem through his purges. In that kind of setting the competing factions are within the ruling nomenklatura, same with imperial courts etc. The point is systems produce too many for them all to be kept sweet with suitable positions so they start scheming away. In eastern cultures, the first thing heirs to the throne often had to do on ascent was slaughter all their male siblings - same principle.

It also specifically covers dynastic China, from which the CCP actually differs little.

China is screwed, but it has us by the balls nonetheless. Dangerous times.
So what's the mechanism in China for competing eleites to emerge - through the CCP?
 
So what's the mechanism in China for competing eleites to emerge - through the CCP?
There are 98 million members of the CCP. There are 10 million in the civil service. These are the contexts for rivals to emerge. In recent years, the opening up of a degree of free enterprise was another potential arena, which Xi has now clamped down on.

If you’ll forgive me, you are looking at this too much through the lens of our context. It’s not tied to any political or social system. The simplest version of their thesis - which arises when they found that 2 or 3 key variables are almost as good predictively, on their own, as when they add the scores more in their model - is basically;

Any elite that becomes sufficiently successful, produces more people that feel entitled to be part of it, than it can accomodate.

Meanwhile, elites invariably end up greedy and funnelling wealth upwards.

These two things produce a resentful would be elite class, and a resentful mass.

Too much of that and things go pop. After that, the elite get put back in their box and reduced in number, and things go back into an integrative phase where wealth is more distributed and there is less competition within a shrunken elite (whether that be the status quo ante or the former counter elite now in power).

After a while the elite become sufficiently successful and we are back to the start.
 
Ps @Archie the history of Chinese warfare is horrific and the CCP is shit scared of it. Their collectivism and dynastic structure makes for long intervals of containment but when it goes bang it goes bang epically, and unconstrained by western codes of war.

They’ve had multiple instances of what would be, in todays population scale hundreds of millions of men, women and children slaughtered; whole chunks of their entire population.
 
Ps @Archie the history of Chinese warfare is horrific and the CCP is shit scared of it. Their collectivism and dynastic structure makes for long intervals of containment but when it goes bang it goes bang epically, and unconstrained by western codes of war.

They’ve had multiple instances of what would be, in todays population scale hundreds of millions of men, women and children slaughtered; whole chunks of their entire population.
Civil war or with other nations?
 
No it’s absolutely not tied to open societies, which make up a fraction of those covered going back to ancient times, ditto capitalism (which I guess is the same thing) contra Moaty’s assumption this is a form of Marxist analysis. Capitalism, communism and liberalism are fleeting and situational in terms of what it is looking at (with whatever greater or lesser degree of success).

It talks for example, about Soviet communism and how Stalin solved the problem through his purges. In that kind of setting the competing factions are within the ruling nomenklatura, same with imperial courts etc. The point is systems produce too many for them all to be kept sweet with suitable positions so they start scheming away. In eastern cultures, the first thing heirs to the throne often had to do on ascent was slaughter all their male siblings - same principle.

It also specifically covers dynastic China, from which the CCP actually differs little.

China is screwed, but it has us by the balls nonetheless. Dangerous times.
Interesting take from Paul Krugman. I suspect he's not to your taste, but he has some interesting numbers on implications for the US of China's troubles How Scary Is China’s Crisis? Opinion | How Scary Is China’s Crisis?
 
Interesting take from Paul Krugman. I suspect he's not to your taste, but he has some interesting numbers on implications for the US of China's troubles How Scary Is China’s Crisis? Opinion | How Scary Is China’s Crisis?
His last bit is the worry. That and the far more serious long term issue that their birth rate is running at basically half replacement rate, so each generation is half the size of the previous. That potentially leads to welfare collapse (or whatever the Chinese approximation is) and in turn, possibly state collapse.

So Xi has to distract / inject some jingoistic pride, and he doesn’t have long to do it. Russia’s population collapse, which is not as drastic, has been speculated as reason why Putin may have considered it a ‘now or never’ moment with Ukraine.

We’d be in the same boat if not for colossal immigration to England, which in time may well bring problems of its own. It’s going to be interesting times.